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RECENT DECISIONS
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure: Discretionary Award of
Costs Under Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332(b) and Federal Rule 54(d)-
Plaintiff brought suit in Federal District Court for a cause of action
arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiff claimed $25,000.00
but obtained a jury verdict of only $8,000.00. Defendant claimed
costs should be awarded to him in accordance with Section 1332(b)
providing that:
Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made
in a statute of the United States, where the plaintiff who
files the case originally in the federal courts is finally ad-
judged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value
of $10,000.00, computed without regard to any set-off and
counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be
entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the District Court
may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose
costs on the plaintiff.'
The court, in construing Section 1332(b), held that at the time
plaintiff commenced his action-he could reasonably have expected
to recover a verdict for the jurisdictional amount of more than
$10,000.00. The court stated that it was convinced plaintiff's claim
for damages was made in good faith and not merely to give a Fed-
eral court jurisdiction. Stachon v. Hoxie, 190 F. Supp. 185 (W.D.
Mich. 1960).
Since 1789 by the Judiciary Act 2 Congress has restricted the
diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts
by requiring that there be a minimum amount in controversy. By
the Act of July 25, 19583 (Section 1331) the minimum amount was
raised to $10,000.00 and the unique feature providing for a discre-
tionary award of costs in the case of recovery of less than $10,000.00,
as quoted above, was added. The purpose of the 1958 Act was to
reduce congestion in the federal courts.4
Section 1332(b), as to most of its features, was the result of the
work of the United States Judicial Conference, particularly its Com-
mittee on Venue and Jurisdiction. However, the provision inter-
preted by the courts in the Stachon case relating to discretionary
costs was not a part of the Judicial Conference recommendation.
This provision was added as a committee amendment in the House.5
It was emphasized in Congress that the increase in jurisdictional
amount was merely an adjustment to the diminution in the value of
128 U.S.C. §1332(b) (1958).
2 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §20, 1 Stat. 78 ($500.00 minimum).
3 28 U.S.C. §§1331-32 (1958).
4 See H.R. Rep. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. passin; (1958).
5 See, 104 CONG. RF-c. 11503, 11508-9 (1958).
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the dollar.6 However, House members feared that this increase in
jurisdictional amount might induce a plaintiff who wished his case
to be heard in the Federal court merely to enlarge greatly the
amount of his claim without regard to the true value thereof.7 Hence
the cost provision was incorporated but since it had not been studied
by the Judicial Conference, the sub-committee decided that it should
go no further than to make imposition of costs within the discretion
of the trial judge."
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary agreed with the House
amendment saying:
This provision will apply only to amounts determined by
a verdict or a final judgment decided by the court; not to
compromise agreements. In deciding whether to deny costs
and/or impose costs on the plaintiff, the court will undoubt-
edly take into consideration, whether the amount claimed
was made in good faith or whether it was made simply to get
into Federal Court. It will also take into consideration the
fact, if it be a fact, that the plaintiff's net recovery has
been reduced by set-off or counterclaim, the validity of which
the plaintiff contested in good faith.9
The court in the Stachon case stated:
An evaluation of the objective manifestations of the legis-
lative intent at the time the statute was enacted clearly indi-
cates that the plaintiff's right to tax costs should depend upon
his good faith in claiming more than the jurisdictional amount
provided in the statute. 10
This decision, which is apparently the first to construe section
1332(b), thus adopts the traditional test of good faith long utilized
by the federal courts to determine whether plaintiff's claim is origi-
nally within the jurdictional amount where jurisdiction is chal-
lenged for lack of jurisdictional amount."- Therefore, it would seem
that only if the defendant has not challenged the plaintiff's jurisdic-
tional amount upon the plaintiff's filing his claim will 1332(b) come
into play. The court held that 1332(b) was intended to be applied
only in cases where the plaintiff has obviously acted in bad faith in
claiming over $10,000.00 in order to bring the action in a federal
court.
The discretionary costs provision does not apply to removed
6 See H.R. Rep. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1958); 1951 Report of the
Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue of the judicial Conference of the
United States, 1957 Hearings 44.7See 1957 Hearings 30-31.
8 See 1957 Hearings, 30, 32.
92 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, at 3103 (1958).
'o Stachon v. Hoxie, 190 F. Supp. 185, 186 (W.D. Mich. 1960).
"St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938); Co-
lumbia Pictures Corp. v. Rogers, 81 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.W.Va. 1949).
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cases, where the defendant rather than the plaintiff has sought the
federal forum.1
2
Rule 12(h) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the court, on its own motion shall dismiss an action if at any
time it appears that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Therefore, it would seem that if during the trial the lack of good
faith is established the court would be required to dismiss the action
for want of jurisdiction originally rather than to retain jurisdiction
and assess costs against the plaintiff under 1332(b). It has been
suggested that a court might be reluctant to dismiss a case near its
conclusion in the interests of the efficient administration of justice,
but willing, instead, to tax costs against the plaintiff after its ver-
dict. 3 But it has also been suggested that a determination not to
dismiss during the trial but to tax costs would seem to require the
logically impossible finding that a plaintiff met the test of good faith
in claiming an amount over $10,000.00 for jurisdictional purposes, and
at the same time did not meet the identical test for the purpose of
awarding costs.'
4
A provision similar to 1332(b) was part of the Judiciary Act of
178915 but was repealed in 1948.16 It provided that a plaintiff recover-
ing an amount of $500.00 or less "shall not be allowed, but . . .
may be adjudged to pay, costs." This sum was never changed
notwithstanding increasing minimum jurisdictional amounts. The
courts refused to hold it amended by implication. 7 This discretion
to tax costs against plaintiff was apparently never exercised but
dicta indicated when costs could be so taxed. In Greene v. Bateman8
the court said:
We are referred to no precedents in this district, or else-
where, of the court in its discretion imposing this additional
burden on the plaintiff .... I can conceive of (such) cases.
... Thus, if the claim of the plaintiff was a trivial or frivolous
one.... Or if the suit seemed brought in this court for vexa-
tion, or the plaintiff having doubtfully a real residence else-
where, and the defendant dragged far from home for trial at
unnecessary and aggravated expense . . . [then costs may be
taxed].19
In another early case,20 a replevin action to recover possession
2 Supra note 5, at 11508.
13 Cowen, Federal Jurisdiction Amended, 44 VA. L. REv. 971, 977 (1958).
14Comment 58 COL. L. REv. 1287 (1958).
'5 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §20, 1 Stat. 83.
16 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §39, 62 Stat. 993.
17 Eastman v. Sherry, 37 Fed. 844 (E.D. Wis. 1889) ; Johnson v. Watkins, '40
Fed. 187 (W.D. Mich. 1889).
Is 10 Fed. Cas. 1126 (No. 5762) (R.I. 1846).29 Id. at 1128. Cf. Hunter v. Marlboro, 12 Fed. Cas. 957 (No. 6908) (C.C. Mass.
1846) ; Cattle v. Payne, 6 Fed. Cas. 616 (No. 3269) (C.C. Conn. 1808).20 Crowe v. Peaslee-Goulbert Co., 37 F. 2d 216 (1st Cir. 1930).
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of goods over the jurisdictional amount and damages for detention,
the plaintiff recovered possession of the goods but only $1.00
damages. The majority held the discretionary costs provision inap-
plicable but the dissent stated the only issue tried or triable on the
pleadings was illegal detention. The dissenter felt that the only
''amount in dispute" was the damage for such detention since the
answer disclaimed any title or other right in the goods. This theory
would seem to disregard the well-established rule that a valid de-
fense in diminution of the amount claimed does not diminish the
amount that is or may be claimed in good faith by the plaintiff. 21
The decisions employing the good faith test in determining
whether plaintiff's claim is originally within the jurisdictional
amount will probably be utilized by the courts in determining what
is good faith under 1332(b). It has been held that mistake on the
part of the plaintiff in making claim to an amount over the jurisdic-
tional amount does not vitiate plaintiff's good faith. 2 Also, plain-
tiff has a right to press his most optimistic theory of recovery.2 3
Subjective good faith of a plaintiff is not the test.24 A study should
be made of the facts, not of the plaintiff's state of mind. In Food Fair
Stores v. Food Fair21the court held that it was not accurate to say that
a finding of good faith as to amount in controversy could not be
based upon future or contingent damages. It pointed out that while
it could not be based upon a mere possibility of future harm, it can
be based upon a present probability of such harm.2 6 In the McNutt
v. General Motors Corp. case27 the court held that if plaintiff's al-
legations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in
any appropriate manner, he must support them by competent proof.
It was determined in that case that plaintiff had the burden of
showing he is properly in court by a preponderance of the evi-
dence .2
Various general phrases have been used by the courts in indi-
cating what would be bad faith. Some illustrations are "magnified
fraudulently beyond the jurisdictional amount, ' 29 "hopelessly exag-
gerated, '3 0 "frivolous"' 1 or that "the court is satisfied to a legal cer-
tainty that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover the requisite
21 Harris v. Ill. Central RR Co., 220 F. 2d 734 (5th Cir. 1955).
22 Sullivan v. Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 145 F. Supp. 702 (E.D. Ky. 1956).
23 Allman v. James Healing Company, 142 F. Supp. 673 (D.N.J. 1956).
24Cumberland v. Household Research Corp. of America, 145 F. Supp. 782
(D. Mass. 1956).
25 177 F. 2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949).
261d. at 184.
27298 U.S. 178 (1936).
28Id. at 189.
29 Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632, 644 (1907).
30 Supra note 24.




jurisdictional amount and that the claim was therefor colorable for
the purpose of conferring jurisdiction. 3 2 If under applicable state
law it is apparent that a real legal controversy exists with respect
to the amount of damages, plaintiff usually will have satisfied this
latter test.3 3 In Saint Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Coln-
pany3 the court held that plaintiff's good faith is open to challenge
not only by resort to the face of the complaint, but by the facts
disclosed at the jurisdictional hearing.
There is a provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
relating to the discretion of the court in allowing costs in addition
to 1332(b). Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that in the absence of express statutory provision ". . costs
shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs.... ." A variety of decisions relating to costs have
resulted from interpretation of this Rule. In two recent cases 35 on
almost identical facts the courts came to different conclusions as
to who should bear the costs. The plaintiff in each case was a sea-
man setting up his claim on three counts: negligence, unseaworthi-
ness of the ship, and recovery of maintenance and cure. They both
recovered on the third count only. The court in one case36 held that
the facts were so "inseparably intertwined" that would be impos-
sible to apportion costs between the counts. The court stated that
many of the facts testified to were relevant on all of the counts. In
conclusion it felt the best solution would be to have each party bear
its own costs. In the other case 37 the court held that the plaintiff
was not the prevailing party on the significant issues. The court felt
that since the plaintiff had prevailed on one minor count it would
in its discretion apportion the costs, i.e., plaintiff recovered one-
third of his costs. Usually, the defendant must prevail on "clearly
severable" matters so as to be entitled to costs on those issues. 38 In
Brown v. Consolidated Fisheries Company39 plaintiff's action at law
claimed $26,581.59 damages. He recovered $1,471.22 and attempted
to tax costs in the sum of $728.60 against defendant. The court held
that the plaintiff was a "prevailing" party within the meaning of
32 St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Company, 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938).
33 Calhoun v. Kentucky-West Va. Ga. Co., 166 F. 2d 530 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Co-
lumbia Pictures v. Grengs, 257 F. 2d 45 (7th Cir. 1958) (punitive damages) ;
Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., v. Bejcy, 201 F. 2d 163 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Fire-
men's Fund Ins. Co. v. Railway Express Ag., Inc., 253 F. 2d 780 (6th Cir.
1958).
34 Supra note 33.
35 Sheaves v. Estrela Corp., 175 F. Supp. 484 (D. Mass. 1959); Simmons v.
American Export Lines, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
36 Sheaves v. Estrela Corp., supra note 35.
37 Simmons v. American Export Lines, Inc., supra note 35.38 Local 205 United E.R.&M. Wkrs. v. General Electric Co., 172 F. Supp. 960
(D. Mass. 1959).
39 18 F.R.D. 433 (D. Dela. 1955).
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the Rule and entitled to costs even though he established only a
portion of his claim. The fact that a plaintiff suing two defendants
recovers against only one does not make him liable for one-half the
costs.40 When a defendant files a counterclaim and neither party
recovers the courts have denied costs to both parties. 41 Another
ground, though it is not frequently used by the courts as a basis
for refusing to allow costs to either party under Rule 54(d), is
"public interest" in the matter in controversy. One court using this
ground felt there was sufficient public interest in an application for
abandonment of a railroad line to deny costs to the parties. 42 An-
other court felt there was a public interest in whether an individual
could properly run for office in an Alaskan House of Representa-
tives.4
3
Some courts feel that an actual recovery much above what the
defendant has admitted to be due is sufficient to impose costs on him
regardless of the relationship of the recovery to the original claim.44
If a defendant is found to have unnecessarily prolonged a proceed-
ing or has greatly increased the costs, regardless of the result on
appeal, the court will not award costs to him45 and will, in addition,
impose all costs on him. The fact that a party has recovered a
large verdict does not permit the court to limit his costs to a small
sum or nothing at all.4"
A recent case 47 has held that the Rules of Civil Procedure are
applicable to all civil actions. Therefore, the court held there is now
no distinction between equitable or legal considerations as to the
discretion of the court in relation to costs.
It is apparent from the foregoing decisions under Rule 54(d)
that prediction as to what a particular federal court will do is very
difficult. Discretion of the court under Rule 54(d) is very wide.
Under this Rule the court takes into consideration the whole con-
duct of the trial and the ultimate result, such as whether plaintiff
recovered on only one of several clearly severable counts, whether
a successful defendant has unduly delayed the trial through the in-
jection of immaterial issues, whether both parties were negligent,
etc. Under 1332(b), however, it would appear from the Stachon case
40 Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Union Compress & W. Co., 146 F. Supp.
482 (W.D. La. 1956).
41 Srybnik v. Epstein, 230 F. 2d 683 (2d Cir. 1956).
.42 Michigan Public Service Comm. v. U.S., 162 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Mich. 1958).
4 Hendrick v. Heintzleman, 141 F. Supp. 633 (D.C. Alaska 1956).
44 Wilson v. Homestead Valve Mfg. Co., 217 F. 2d 792 (3d Cir. 1954) ; (claimed:($29,577.41; recovered: $4,900.00) ; Palma v. Fox, 182 F. 2d 895 (2d Cir.
1950).45 Bowman v. West Disinfecting Company, 25 F.R.D. 280 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).46 Lichter Foundation Inc. v. Welch, 269 F. 2d 142 (6th Cir. 1959).
4 Proshker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 24 F.R.D. 305 (D. Del. 1959).
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that the court will limit its investigation to plaintiff's good faith
when the action is commenced.
NANcY A. Simos
Federal Income Taxation-Alimony Deduction-"Fixed" Pay-
ments for the Support of Children. A deficiency was asserted against
the taxpayer because he took a deduction for the full amount of alimony
paid to his wife. The Commissioner's contention was based on a provi-
sion in the divorce decree that "in the event that any of the [three]
children . . . shall marry, become emancipated, or die, then the pay-
ments herein specified [which were awarded to the wife alone] shall
on the happening of each such event be reduced in a sum equal to one-
sixth of the payments which would thereafter otherwise accrue." He
asserted that this provision bought one-half of the alimony payments
within the terms of the predecessor of Section 71(b) of the 1954 Inter-
nal Revenue Code' as sums "fixed" for the support of children. Also,
since such sums would not be included in the wife's gross income, they
should not have been taken as deductions by the husband. 2 The Tax
Court3 agreed with the Commissioner and held that the decree "as a
whole," fixed these payments for the support of the children. The
Court of Appeals 4 reversed and held that this provision did not "fix"
any sum that the wife was obligated to use for the support of the child-
ren prior to the happening of any of the contingencies. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. It held that the
intent of Congress was to provide certainty in this area and thus there
must be a specific designation of amounts to be used for the support
of children, and not an allocation based on inference or conjecture.
Commissioner v. Lester, -U.S.-, 81 S. Ct. 1343 (1961).
Prior to this decision, there was a dispute in the Tax Court and the
various circuit courts over the interpretation of Section 71(b). By
granting certiorari,5 the Supreme Court finally decided to take a position
and settle the dispute. Provisions in divorce decrees which stated that
a certain unqualified sum was to go to the wife, or that specified that
' Section 22(k) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended in 1942,
provided: "This subsection shall not apply to that part of any such periodic
payment which the terms of the decree or written instrument fix, in terms of
an amount of money or a portion of the payment, as a sum which is payable
for the support of minor children of such husband." Section 71 (b) contains
substantially the same language: "Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part
of any payment which the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement fix,
in terms of an amount of money or a part of the payment, as a sum which is
payable for the support of minor children of the husband." In this article,
further reference to the provision will be made to Section 71(b) only.
2See: Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §215.
3 Lester v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1156 (1959).
4Lester v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960).
5 Certiorari was denied in Commissioner v. Weil, 353 U.S. 958 (1957), and
Eisinger v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 913 (1958).
